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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
Today more then ever, South, Central, West, andSoutheast Asia are crucial gateways for China toaccess natural resources and sea routes that can
guarantee regular trade flows and stable economic growth.
China’s regional neighbours, however, often join forces to
prevent China from affirming and protecting its own interests
in these areas.  
Rather than choosing the option of open competition, China
has progressively adopted a cooperative multilateral
approach in the region, and is now involved in several
regional organizations. Within these fora, China interacts
with other Asian countries and negotiates common policies
and strategies with them. In most cases, China retains its sta-
tus as the most powerful country in the region, and can eas-
ily affirm its interests and points of view. However, as Asian
countries share a long tradition of mutual suspicion and mis-
trust, these arenas have progressively shown their usefulness
in regional confidence-building by substantially easing some
of the mutual misunderstandings and sources of mistrust
between Asian nations.
The aim of this paper is to focus on China’s ambitions and
achievements in Southeast Asia through a review of four
international groupings: the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), with special attention to the China-
ASEAN framework; the Asian Regional Forum (ARF);
the ASEAN+3 platform; and the East Asian Summit
(EAS). This structure will allow a brief additional overview
of China’s interactions with three prominent powers: the
United States, Japan, and India. The role these countries
are playing in ARF, ASEAN+3, and EAS, respectively,
cannot be neglected in an analysis of China’s regional inter-
ests, aims, and targets. In addition, whether China is achiev-
ing its objectives or not depends on how and to what extent
these three countries are counterbalancing Chinese influ-
ence in the region, and their bilateral and multilateral inter-
actions deeply affect the consolidation of Asian regional
integration.  Chi na a nd ASEA N: Fro ma nim os ity  to  co op er at ion
Although China is widely recognized today as having strong
and developed links with ASEAN countries, it is useful to
remember that the seed of ASEAN was the strong anti-
communist feeling shared by Southeast Asian nations. 
ASEAN was set up in Bangkok on 8 August 1967 by the
governments of Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore,
and the Philippines. It has been documented that
“ASEAN’s founding purpose was to ensure the survival of
its members by promoting regional stability and limiting com-
petition between them.” (1) The Bangkok Declaration speci-
fied that ASEAN was not an appropriate forum to handle
security matters or political controversies. On the contrary,
Southeast Asian countries defined three strategies oriented
at reducing “the appeal of internal Communist insurgencies
by promoting socio-economic development,” limiting “the
regional military influence of external actors,” and reducing
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Geographically and strategically, Southeast Asia represents the natural extension of China’s interests in the region.
In the course of discussing China’s role in four regional organizations, ASEAN, ARF, ASEAN+3, and EAS, its
interactions with the United States, Japan, and India will be reviewed as well. The goal of this paper is to consider
whether or not China has maintained and is maintaining a dominant position within these fora.  
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“intra-ASEAN competition and improving relationships
between members.” (2) According to some other scholars, in
1967, “on the initiative of (Indonesian) President Suharto
(…) ASEAN was set up to counter China which was very
aggressive in sponsoring ‘revolutionary movements’ across
Southeast Asia.” (3)
In essence, ASEAN nations became cautious and suspicious
when, “from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s, Beijing placed
ideological alignment over state-to-state relations by support-
ing Communist insurgents in non-communist countries.” (4)
However, the realignment between China and the United
States in the early 1970s, and Deng Xiaoping’s launch of
economic reform and the accompanying open-door policy in
1978, created more trust (and economic opportunities) for
Southeast Asian countries. Indeed, China normalised rela-
tions with most of them in the 1970s, and the delicate issue
of “overseas Chinese” was resolved. In the 1980s, Deng
Xiaoping regarded Singapore as the model for Chinese
development, and some Southeast Asian countries such as
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand began considering China
“a security concern, though not as serious as before.” (5)
Despite these improvements, however, the issue of the
Spratly Islands, a group of more than 100 reefs, islets, and
islands in the South China Sea with a total area of less than
five square kilometres, has remained unresolved throughout
these decades. “The post-war dispute over (these islands)
originated from the 1951 San Francisco peace agreement,
which failed to stipulate who was to possess the Spratlys
after Japan.” (6) At that time, six governments claimed partial
sovereignty over these islands:  Vietnam, the Philippines,
Brunei, Malaysia, China, and Taiwan. In the case of the
Spratlys, sovereignty was claimed not merely for the sake of
its rich fisheries, but rather to attain “the legal right to con-
trol and develop the area’s energy resources, which (all
these countries needed) to fuel their rapid economic devel-
opment.” (7) China’s victory in its skirmish with Vietnam in
1988, and its occupation of the Philippine-claimed Mischief
Reef in 1995, “implied that the balance of power in the
region was changing to the advantage of China.” (8)
Moreover, Southeast Asian countries’ disagreements on the
issue highlighted the need for dialogue. (9)
The situation finally improved in the early twenty-first centu-
ry after China and ASEAN agreed to create a code of con-
duct aimed at easing tensions over the disputed islands. In
November 2002, a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea was signed, and all countries “recog-
nized the need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmo-
nious environment in the South China Sea between them
for the enhancement of peace, stability, economic growth
and prosperity in the region.” (10) However, the Spratly
Islands remain a source of concern, since the 2002 agree-
ment lacks a legally binding code of conduct. Furthermore,
in recent years China has strengthened military control over
occupied islands, islets, and other waters, and has stepped
up exploration and exploitation of natural resources in the
region. At the same time, “world powers such as the U.S.,
Japan and India have increased their military infiltration in
the South China Sea regions, pushing the issue towards a
more complicated and internationalized level.” (11)
From the perspective of economic cooperation, 1997 was a
pivotal year for China-ASEAN relations. It is usually
remembered as the year in which “leaders from ASEAN
countries and China held the first informal Summit in Kuala
Lumpur (Malaysia) to officially recognize the ASEAN-
China process and to adopt the strategy of ‘good neighborli-
ness’ and ‘mutual trust’ to strengthen and expand ASEAN-
China ties in the twenty-first century.” (12) The Asian finan-
cial crisis in 1997 gave China a further opportunity to offer
help to Southeast Asian countries. Following the Thai gov-
ernment’s failure to stop the collapse of the Thai baht
against the US dollar, the financial crisis rapidly spread to
South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Laos, the Philippines,
and Hong Kong as well, forcing most of these countries to
float their currencies. The crisis also generated panic among
borrowers, a collapse of demand, and a loss of confidence
throughout the region. Moreover, even a potential “export-
driven recovery, benefiting from the devalued currencies and
improved competitiveness, was blocked by the fact that many
firms had no access to credit for importing raw materials,”
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and these conditions further fed a wave of bankruptcies that
overwhelmed Southeast Asia. (13)
Japan immediately offered its help by discussing the creation
of an Asian fund, but “reeling from the legacies of (its) own
bubble economy, (the country) was easily persuaded by the
US to drop the plan.” (14) Furthermore, as soon as Taiwan,
China’s renegade province, became a potential partner for
assistance in Southeast Asia, China perceived this option as
a “deliberate Taiwanese attempt to undermine the ‘One
China’ policy of ASEAN’s nations.” At the East Asian
Summit in Kuala Lumpur, China “promised to refrain from
devaluing the Yuan, and also signed a joint statement over
future relations with ASEAN.” (15) Stabilisation of China’s
national currency pushed the recovery of the whole region,
and Chinese unconditional offer of economic aid further
encouraged its neighbours’ trust. (16)
In recent decades, China has increasingly embraced cooper-
ation and multilateralism in world politics. “Prior to 1996
China viewed regional organization with plenty of reserva-
tion and purposefully refrained from joining any multilateral
regional organization.” (17) However, after the first multilater-
al agreements were signed, “China realized that by integrat-
ing with multilateral institutions it could establish a favorable
image and even forge mutually beneficial relationships with
major powers and the region.” (18)
The role of reciprocal economic interests as a driver of China-
ASEAN relations since the 1980s was demonstrated by
Southeast Asian reactions to the Tiananmen incident in
1989. (19) Holding up the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-exis-
tence defined in 1955 during the first Asia-Africa Summit (the
Bandung conference of non-aligned countries), both Indonesia
and Singapore established diplomatic ties with Beijing one year
after the incident, and Brunei followed just one year later. (20) At
the same time, as the 5 percent annual economic growth regis-
tered by the five ASEAN economies raised the spectre of retal-
iation by Western countries, China needed to reduce its heavy
reliance on Western economies, diversify its trade, and conse-
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quently consider ASEAN countries as alternative economic
partners. (21)
The continuing development of ASEAN nations and the strong
economic performance of the Chinese economy led ASEAN-
China bilateral trade to grow at a rate of about 17 percent per
year from 1991 to 2000, and 20 percent from 2001 to 2007. (22)
During the last 15 years, China has also committed itself to eas-
ing the economic divide between new and old ASEAN mem-
bers. (23) Indeed, “in 2003 the average per-capita GDP in the
ASEAN-6 was US$1,626 compared with US$356 in the
ASEAN-4,” not to mention disparities in economic size and
the purchasing power of national currencies. (24) At the same
time, some ASEAN nations complained that regional econom-
ic integration with China had forced local companies out of the
market. (25) However, China replied to these statements by not-
ing that the trade balance between China and ASEAN strong-
ly favoured Southeast Asian countries, showing that China was
an economic partner that ASEAN could not easily dismiss. (26)
Two improvements in China-ASEAN relations can be identi-
fied today. First, China has become the largest provider of
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (27) in most Southeast Asian
countries. China is also financing most of the infrastructural
projects in the region, partly out of a desire to prove itself a loyal
partner in the economic development of the region, and partly
because improvements in transportation infrastructure inevitably
boost bilateral trade.   
The second positive improvement is linked to the Agreement
on ASEAN-China Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
signed in 2002, under which a free trade zone (CAFTA)
should be completed in 2010. (28)
Under this agreement, which affects 1.8 billion people, several
protocols have been signed, and the tariff cut process already
began in 2005. (29) Since then, multilateral trade has steadily
increased, and both sides are now discussing “setting up a num-
ber of economic trade cooperation zones in the ASEAN region
to facilitate more intra-investments.” (30) Ideally, “CAFTA will
increase the region’s market appeal and further attract regional
and non-regional FDI. (Further,) firms will be able to break up
the value chain by distributing production stages throughout the
region in a way that exploits the individual members’ comparative
advantages. Besides, subsidiaries will be able to enjoy greater
economies of scale, thus making them more profitable.” (31)
China’s interest in Asia and in economic development within
the region has recently created spill-over in membership and in
the issues discussed in the fora. While taking note of the advan-
tages of a deeply integrated region, Asian countries have also
become wary of China’s own interests, and have started engag-
ing in a healthy competitive process. Japan, South Korea, India,
Australia, and New Zealand are all looking to involve them-
selves in regional fora. (32) While all of these countries stand to
benefit from broader economic integration, it is possible that
their engagement policy has been chosen as much to counter-
balance the Chinese presence in the region as it is to pursue
their national interests. (33)
Before discussing the evolution of regional equilibrium in the
ASEAN+3 and EAS platforms that involve all of the above-
mentioned countries, and explaining whether and how they are
preventing China from fulfilling its aims, this paper will give an
example of the second kind of spill-over China has created in
the region, in which new international fora have been estab-
lished in order to allow multilateral cooperation to expand
beyond the scope of economic integration.   Chi na a nd A SEA N Re giona lF or um:  F irs t  s te ps  in  se curi tyc oop er a tio n 
Following the path of regionalisation, the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) was established in 1994 to draw China into
a regional security process. The ARF is an informal multi-
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lateral organization in which members (including the
ASEAN countries, China, European Union, India, Japan,
Pakistan, Russia, and the United States) seek to address
security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Although the aim of the first meeting was to make “all par-
ticipants -- especially China -- ‘comfortable’ with the process
and the other states,” the second meeting, in 1995, initiated
discussions on the promotion of “confidence-building meas-
ures, the development of preventive diplomacy mechanism
and conflict-resolution mechanism.” (34) However, the broad
membership, with its cultural and political diversity, has
proven a hindrance for achieving cooperation and the sign-
ing of agreements, and progress has been both difficult and
slow. 
Analysing China’s role within the ARF provides an oppor-
tunity to discuss China-US bilateral relations, as this is one
of two regional fora in which the United States is directly
involved. The second forum is the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC), created in 1989 as a “consultative
body whose aim was weighing the interests of the Asia-
Pacific countries against the Europeans in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations.” (35)
Since its foundation, APEC has tried to implement several
initiatives aimed at dismantling trade barriers in the region;
creating a dispute mediation mechanism; fostering monetary
and macroeconomic cooperation; and compromising on tech-
nical cooperation projects for development of human
resources, tourism, infrastructure, and energy. (36) Despite its
good intentions, its achievements have not been as signifi-
cant as expected, mainly because of an excessively broad
and diverse membership that includes countries whose
deeply conflicting national interests prevent them from mov-
ing beyond a consensus scheme. 
In this respect, ARF and APEC share similar problems.
However, some authors argue that ARF has actually been
“an ASEAN initiative whose creation the Chinese were
powerless to prevent. China joined the ARF not least so it
could put a brake on initiatives that the Chinese saw as inim-
ical to their interests and to try to keep other issues off the
agenda.” (37) Other authors have interpreted “issues such as
the unresolved threat to regional stability generated by the
repeated outbreaks of haze in Southeast Asia, the lack of a
timely ARF response to the crisis in East Timor, or the
absence of effective regional mechanism to prevent narcotics
trafficking and small-arms smuggling” as symptoms of ARF’s
diminishing (or nonexistent) relevance in the region. (38)
It might be reasonable to conclude that with its current mem-
bership, powers, and institutions the ARF will have difficul-
ty playing more then a consultative role. However, to a con-
siderable extent ARF’s success also depends on Chinese
and American attitudes. Both countries initially opposed the
idea of a rational multilateral security forum, and even after
deciding to join, they have remained reluctant players in
it. (39)
Once China stopped considering ARF a “tool in the hands
of the Western powers for interfering in the domestic affairs
of the Asian member states,” ARF became an “important
vehicle for airing its own security perceptions and advancing
its security interests.” (40) Indeed, China has recently used
ARF meetings to convince Asian partners that it was a
responsible country rather then one interested in destabiliz-
ing the region. 
For the United States, ARF has been useful, first of all to
confirm US interest in the East Asian region. Secondly, the
Clinton administration noticed that there were no benefits to
opposing this initiative, and rather little cost and some gain
in joining it. (41) Thirdly, ARF Summits have become useful
for monitoring the Chinese threat in the region. 
However, over the years neither China nor the United
States has been able to influence ARF as much as they
intended, and neither has ever gained a leading position
within the forum, as a result of which ARF has lost its
potential for active conflict resolution and has been relegat-
ed to mere confidence building. China  a nd A SEAN+3:  Bui ldingnew  A sia n bo rde rs  
ASEAN+3 is a regional framework created by ASEAN
countries, China, Japan, and South Korea in 1997, initially
aimed at sharing the burden of the Asian financial crisis.
Even though it was initially a very informal gathering, after
a few meetings the ASEAN+3 Summits became regu-
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larised, and the institutionalisation of the new grouping
began. (42)
Generally speaking, this new forum was created for two rea-
sons. From a pure economic perspective, adding countries
such as China, Japan, and South Korea to ASEAN was
intended to diversify the economies of the region by taking
advantage of more complementarities and attracting power-
ful countries that could share the cost of re-launching Asian
economic growth -- not only in terms of trade balance but
also by expanding industrial and infrastructural investment
within the region. From a political perspective the choice of
these three countries was meant to forge “a more coherent
grouping of East Asian states,” and at the same time prevent
any of them from gaining hegemonic status in the region. (43)
ASEAN+3 made it possible to engage China in another
multilateral scheme and also boost the ASEAN-Japan rela-
tionship. Finally, it was broadly recognized that “ASEAN’s
desire to secure itself against future crises could not be real-
ized unless the Northeast Asian countries were included.” (44)
Earlier in this paper, CAFTA (China-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement) was introduced as a symbol of China’s impor-
tance in the Asian regional economy, and as “an important
practical step in fostering closer economic integration.” (45) In
reality, CAFTA played a crucial role in achieving other aims
as well. (46) As “Japan was originally very reluctant to join the
ASEAN+3 process for fear of antagonizing the United
States,” but at the same time “could not afford to let China
gain an uncontested leadership position in the region,” Japan
chose economic integration as a compromise and started dis-
cussing regional free trade agreements (FTA) as well. After
signing several bilateral FTAs with Singapore in 2002 and
with Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia in 2003, dur-
ing the Bali Summit (2003), Japan and ASEAN agreed to
set up a Closer Economic Partnership to strengthen their
economic integration. A Japan-ASEAN FTA approved in
2007 should be completed by the end of 2008. (47)
The first full ASEAN+3 meeting of all 13 members was
organized in 1999 in the Philippines, and on this occasion
the Joint Statement on East Asian Cooperation was issued,
which stated that:
…mindful of the challenges and opportunities in the
new millennium, as well as the growing regional inter-
dependence in the age of globalization and informa-
tion, (the ASEAN+3 countries) agreed to promote
dialogue and to deepen and consolidate collective
efforts with a view to advancing mutual understand-
ing, trust, good neighborliness and friendly relations,
peace, stability and prosperity in East Asia and the
world. (48)
From this statement it is evident that even this association
was not seen as contributing to the regional integration
process. Indeed, while all countries accepted mutual respect
for sovereignty, non-interference in each other’s internal
affairs, and consensus as a decision-making mechanism, all
made it clear that they were not interested in anything
beyond economic cooperation, as the economy was consid-
ered the only area in which a cooperative strategy could suc-
ceed without imposing on the sovereignty of any state.
Indeed, while the ASEAN+3 grouping has progressively
enlarged its areas of cooperation to include agriculture,
labour, environment, tourism, health, and information tech-
nology, the strategies in these areas seldom go beyond dec-
larations of intents.
In 1997, a debate started at the ASEAN level “over
whether or not to reform the organization’s policy of non-
intervention,” following the suggestion of then Malaysian
Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim to push for “closer
ties between the newer, less economically developed states
and their wealthier counterparts, as well as for the creation
of more robust political and legal institutions and a concomi-
tant development of civil society.” (49) However, this idea was
set aside as soon as the Asian financial crisis revealed how
interdependence caused one state’s problems to affect all of
its neighbours. Since then, any attempt to discuss reforms or
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notions such as “flexible engagement” or “enhanced interac-
tion,” while ostensibly welcomed, has been criticised as soon
as any country denounced failure to abide by the rule of
non-interference. (50)
The most important bilateral relation in the ASEAN+3 con-
text is that between China and Japan. Even though China
and South Korea are still resolving some loose ends such as
“the treatment of Chinese workers in South Korea-run
Chinese factories and questions of historical identity and
sovereignty,” these issues are not as problematic as those
affecting China-Japan bilateral relations. (51) “Within this
dyad, issues of history, culture and identity clash with strug-
gles for regional influence and power. The problems posed
by ongoing visits of the Japanese leadership to the
Yasukunui shrine and the portrayals of wartime activities in
Japanese high school textbooks frequently cause bilateral
frictions.” (52)
Although recent exchanges of visits by high-ranking Chinese
and Japanese officials indicate an improvement in bilateral
ties and mutual confidence, deeply-rooted animosity contin-
ues to hinder East Asian (and Sino-Japanese) appeasement. 
Even so, the creation of ASEAN+3 can be considered a
step forward in terms of regional integration by dealing with
some of the problems ASEAN had left unresolved. Within
ASEAN, intra-regional trade has always been troublesome,
as all ten nations have similar industrial outputs. The +3 for-
mula has significantly eased this condition by increasing
regional industrial complementarities. China, Japan, and
South Korea, as the region’s three largest economies, all rep-
resent potential markets for Southeast Asian primary prod-
ucts, and can boost the economies of ASEAN countries
through FDI and other types of investment.
At the same time, because all three countries offer the
potential of playing similar roles, ASEAN can look to any
of them for boosting national growth. This achieves the
aim of balancing the regional equilibrium of power, or
more simply, of counterbalancing Chinese influence in the
region. China  a nd The  Ea st  As iaSumm it :  B ey ond A sia nenl ar ge me nt
The East Asia Summit (EAS) is a pan-Asian forum creat-
ed to complement, rather than replace, ASEAN and
APEC. Unique and very new, this institution held its inau-
gural session in Kuala Lampur in December 2005. Its mem-
bership is quite broad and diverse (although less so than
APEC), including the ten ASEAN members, China,
Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand.
EAS was founded as a confidence-building body and as a
framework for “encourag[ing] frank and constructive
exchange of views without ignoring contentious issues.” (53)
While too new to show any meaningful and reliable trends
within the region, EAS appears to offer the most consistent
framework for Asian (economic) integration and effectively
counterbalancing Chinese regional influence. 
The advantage of EAS is in its presentation of itself as
something new rather than as an enlargement of an existing
forum. Indeed, while the “ASEAN+” label seems based on
the assumption that ASEAN’s door remains open to further
enlargement on the path to integration, providing the new
forum with a completely different name implies that once
agreement is reached, the grouping will focus on deepening
its internal integration, achieving mutual-beneficial results,
and strengthening common identity.  
As shown in previous sections, Asian nations have never
stopped trying to prevent China from achieving its regional
objectives, and here again, “the ‘big region’ of the EAS is
seen as an effective means of neutralizing Chinese power.”
However, today’s concern is that EAS might “turn out to be
not much more than a talking shop exactly because of its size
and diversity and because of its geostrategic role in prevent-
ing Chinese hegemony.” (54) That would condemn EAS to
the same ineffectiveness experienced by APEC and ARF.
From a different perspective, India’s involvement extends
regional economic integration to a country that shares simi-
lar economic and trade concerns with China, but also com-
petes with it on specific strategic views and issues. Japan’s
recent  consideration of India as a potential economic alter-
native to China clearly indicates that mistrust still dominates
multilateral relations in the region, and that all countries are
definitely interested in maintaining a balance of power in
Asia that benefits all alike. 
The competition between China and India is most evident
in Southeast Asia, where the two countries have overlapping
and conflicting interests. The ASEAN-India relationship
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cannot be considered as important as the ASEAN-China
one, given the inferior economic opportunities offered to
Southeast Asian countries by India’s lesser integration into
the ASEAN framework and its less intense and widespread
economic growth. Overseas Chinese communities also play
a larger role than Indian communities in ASEAN countries.
As a result, India’s relations with ASEAN will require more
time to improve, in spite of India’s political importance and
large potential market. Even the India-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement scheduled for 2007 failed to materialize due to
problems with rules of origin and quotas. During the last
meeting of ASEAN economic ministers in Singapore in
August 2008, ASEAN and India finally reached a compro-
mise for the trade-in-goods agreement, representing the first
step in accomplishing their FTA process. However, Indian
economic minister Kamal Nath was vague on when the
details for the next two steps (negotiations over services and
investments) will be defined. (55)
China and India have conflicting interests in ASEAN coun-
tries as well. Thailand has always maintained a strong rela-
tionship with India, and is one of the countries most engaged
in pushing New Delhi to deepen and intensify its links with-
in ASEAN. In Myanmar, India is expanding cooperation in
the energy and trade sector as a means of preventing Yangon
from falling completely under Beijing’s influence. Up to now,
India has managed to keep the development of Sittwa port
under its control while China has been able to set up ener-
gy cooperation joint-ventures. (56) Finally, India is attempting
to rebalance Chinese influence in Malaysia and Singapore
through plans to create some “Singapore-India Special
Economic Zones.” (57)
Within the EAS, animosity and misunderstanding between
India and China corresponds with that existing between
China and Japan, and to a lesser extent between South
Korea and some of the other ASEAN countries. It is only
reasonable, under the circumstances, that the current status
and regional ambitions of Asian countries will create ten-
sions. (58) Even so, during the ninth ASEAN Summit in Bali
in 2003, Asian leaders affirmed their mutual desire to cre-
ate an ASEAN Economic Community, described as:
the realization of the end-goal of economic integration
as outlined in the ASEAN Vision 2020, (whose aim
is creating) a stable, prosperous and highly competi-
tive ASEAN economic region in which there is free
flow of goods, services, investment and a freer flow of
capital, equitable economic development and reduced
poverty and socio-economic disparities. (59)
Today’s hope is that these aims will be achieved by the EAS
rather than by ASEAN. 
An East Asian community composed of the 16 EAS
participants would represent more then 60 percent of
the world’s population and possess a combined GDP
greater then the European Union. It could provide
significantly increased trade benefits to its members,
help dampen Sino-Japanese rivalry, ease the present
tensions in the region over Japan’s Pacific War,
encourage more cooperative attitudes toward the
issue of natural resource exploitation in East Asia,
promote engagement over containment, and prevent
domination of the region by any major power. (60)
Although ASEAN is often considered the grouping that
should lead the way in forging this East Asian community,
questions remain as to whether it is strong enough to play
this role. This paper suggests that the emergence of a new
balance of power seems a more likely and also a more suit-
able solution for shaping an efficient and effective East
Asian Community.Co nclus ion
While retracing the evolution of ASEAN, ASEAN+3, and
EAS, this paper finds that two trends remain unchanged:
first, China’s desire to be involved in these regional group-
ings and its attempt to attain a dominant position within
them; and second, Asian countries’ intention to avoid being
left out of any kind of regional integration formula. China’s
success in forging a “special relationship” with Southeast
Asian nations has led them to perceive China as less of a
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threat and to start pushing for deeper economic and political
contacts with their powerful neighbour. The effect on region-
al multilateral relations has often been described as an
attempt by other Asian countries to either match or counter-
balance China’s status. 
As described in previous sections, this healthy competitive
process has served to deepen regional economic integration,
but a new balance of power in political and strategic cooper-
ation in Asia remains elusive.
In terms of economic integration, China’s goal of becoming
the regional leader has been limited by the many other coun-
tries included in the integration bowl. Although including
nations such as India, Australia, and New Zealand has
served China’s interests by making their minerals and raw
materials more accessible for use in China’s economic devel-
opment, their effect on the broader balance of power in Asia
cannot be underestimated. While India, Australia, and New
Zealand offer a counterbalance to ASEAN countries’
dependency on Chinese raw materials, Japan and South
Korea offer alternatives to China as sources of foreign direct
investment and as markets for exports. For other Asian coun-
tries, regional cooperation not only boosts multilateral trade
flows, but also helps limit China’s run for regional leader-
ship. Indeed, China, Japan, India, and indirectly the United
States, are all equally apprehensive of the regional balance
of power shifting in favour of any one of them, and while
China remains the most powerful country in Asia, its need
to cooperate with all other nations in the region obliges it to
engage in compromise.
In terms of political integration, it is often argued that the
“ASEAN way of diplomacy” is the main hindrance to fur-
thering political integration. However, this paper argues that
the “ASEAN policy” style has always been to protect Asian
nations from sacrificing “sovereignty or independence of
action to a supranational body.” (61) The “ASEAN way of
diplomacy” has from the outset been based on the
Indonesian words musyawarah and mufakat (discussion and
agreement; consensus and consultation), and within
ASEAN it is broadly recognized that a leader should not act
arbitrarily or impose his will, but rather make gentle sugges-
tions of the path a community should follow, being careful
always to consult all other participants fully and to take their
views and feeling into consideration before delivering his
conclusions (… as) the negotiations take place in the spirit
of musyawarah are not between opponents but as between
friends and brothers. (62)
Indirectly born from ASEAN, ARF, ASEAN+3, and EAS
also follow the ASEAN “way of diplomacy.” However,
despite regular meetings and negotiations, the rule of con-
sensus perfectly suits Asian countries, since they are not
ready to accept any interference in their national policy or to
see their interests succumb to a majority vote. This orienta-
tion is further confirmed by the fact that ARF, as the only
regional security framework, has a merely confidence-build-
ing rather than active conflict resolution role, and that
ASEAN+3 cooperation strategies seldom go beyond decla-
rations of intent in non-economic areas.
However, since Asia has finally recognized that the status
quo will not achieve the desired results, and that economic
integration is critical for the region’s future, it can be
assumed that all Asian countries are interested in establish-
ing an institutionalized regional forum that can help them
achieving a deeper, broader, and more effective regional
integration. 
At the same time, Asia should avoid redundant discussion
fora. In its path to integration, Europe has managed to erad-
icate most of its “old-fashioned” regional organizations in an
effort to reduce confusion and overlapping tasks among
member states and institutions. Achieving the same goal
may be more difficult for Asia, but restricting dialogue to a
few regional organizations is crucial to consolidating Asian
regional integration. Otherwise, Asian nations will continue
to abandon any summit where discussions don’t go their way
and set up alternative frameworks with more like-minded
regional partners, thereby diminishing the importance and
effectiveness of any regional framework. 
Since China is currently the most powerful and influential
country in Asia, it can be expected to avoid downsizing
negotiations to a unique table, as this seems the only option
other regional nations have to counterbalance Chinese polit-
ical and economic weight, and thereby prevent China from
behaving as a primus inter pares. •
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